September 1945


For the vast majority of leaders in the White House and before that in the Vice President’s offices, visitors to H.A. saw me little more than a piece of furniture so they felt free to talk openly in front of me.  At first this infuriated me, then I saw that it had an upside by allowing me to be privy to all the major and minor developments.

I also thought I had developed some political trust with H.A., so with the war over and as things calmed down, or as much as things calm down in the White House, I made my presentation to H.A. on my two pet issues:  J. Edgar Hoover and Spain.

I clearly spelled out the reasons why J. Edgar Hoover should be fired [redacted false claims of limiting the liberties of Americans.  Subject has a sick hero worship of anarchist Emma Goldman. -A.S.]

H.A. said that while it was clear that “Hoover specializes in building up a file against various public figures…” and “is apparently on his way to become an American Himmler” he was not prepared to fire him.  H.A. thought that with the right Attorney General leading the Department of Justice, he could keep a better watch on Hoover on the inside than if Hoover was terminated and started working directly for his opposition. 

Although H.A. is squeaky clean, I think that Hoover has too many files on key Democrats – and Hoover specializes in detailed records on extra marital affairs and odd sexual proclivities – that his removal would end far too many careers and lives.  As new and egregious developments arise I will continue my campaign.

I made even less headway in my other issue – freeing Spain.  The Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade called for a V-S (Victory in Spain –A.S.) Day following the surrender of Japan.  H.A. said that his focus was on peace not a new front.

I was saddened by his refusal to take any action toward my issues, but I knew my chances were slim.  I will just have to wait for the right opportunities to broach them again.

Even without the war, H.A. has a full plate in securing the peace and building the economy.

With the end of the war and the resulting reduction of defense spending and the demobilization of millions of troops who needed to be absorbed into the economy, many economists were fearful of another Great Depression.  In his message to Congress following the end of the war, H.A. called for a “people’s peace” and a “peace of abundance.”  H.A. saw that a strong and activist government was necessary to achieve these goals the postwar years.  He said government “action should be taken to check the decline in employment… and government should be authorized to initiate its own supplementary programs if such stimulation fails to do the job.”  The economy at the end of the war was producing $200 billion in goods and services.  This was almost double its production in any year before the war.  The United States has 52 million domestic workers and 12 million in uniform so we have to find a way to employ the men and women leaving the armed services and find markets for their productive capacity.  H.A. told Congress the key was recognizing “the future of the American worker lies in the well-being of American private enterprise, and the future of private enterprise lies in the well-being of the American worker… as one team, there are no limits on what America can accomplish.”

If the United States can produce ships, tanks, and planes needed to fight a world-wide war, we can produce houses, cars, clothing, education, recreation and other necessities “on a scale that staggers the imagination.”  This production was not to simply supply the demand for consumer items, but to build a better future for America and the world.  “The items on this list include our need for more houses than ever before, more hospitals, more schools, more rural developments, more and better transportation facilities, more industrialization in the South and other regions where people normally are under-employed and don’t produce enough – and, finally, more international cooperation to build up the undeveloped human and natural resources of other lands.  These are some of the people’s unfilled orders that must go onto the books of the nation.  They represent millions of jobs and work to be done everywhere that needs only a touch of government encouragement and stimulation to release the driving power of private enterprise.”

H.A. argued that there was a middle course between the planned economies of the socialist states and the traditional laissez-faire of capitalist economies.  This middle ground would be obtained through a “full employment budget” that would take into account not only government activity, but all economic activity public and private.  This budget would allow the government to promote growth, reduce unemployment, or combat inflation where necessary. 

To implement this plan H.A. drafted full-employment legislation with the help of a team of prominent industrialists and economists.   Conservative Republicans and southern Democrats united to strip some of the features of the bill, but the legislation did pass as the Employment Act of 1946. 

H.A. also appointed a committee to study the patent system, which favored monopolies and international cartels and H.A. sought to increase funding in government research, the findings of which he would make available to U.S. businesses. 

With the development of the atomic bomb, H.A. realized the power of government funding of research.

H.A. also knew that the atomic bomb was key to securing the peace, but not in the way that the conservative forces in America wanted – to scare the Soviet Union into submission.  On September 12, H.A. issued his position with regard to the bomb,  “Atomic power means ‘one world or no world,” H.A. said, “We must move with speed, determination and faith.  The stakes are the human race.  We cannot fail.  We cannot delay… If we fail there will be a senseless armament race and chaos.”

H.A. sought to place atomic weaponry under international control with the aim of destroying “all weapons of offensive warfare,” and promote the civilian and peaceful uses of atomic energy through a civilian atomic power commission. 

“I still recognize the difficulty and am still convinced of the ultimate importance of a change in Russia attitude toward individual liberty, but I have come to the conclusion that it would not be possible to use our possession of the atomic bomb as a direct lever to produce change.  I have become convinced that any demand by us for an internal change in Russia as a condition of sharing in the atomic weapon would be so resented that it would make the objective we have in view less probable… Accordingly, unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited into the partnership upon a basis of cooperation and trust, we are going to maintain the Anglo-American bloc over against the Soviet in the possession of this weapon.  Such a condition will almost certainly stimulate feverish activity on the part of the Soviet toward the development of this bomb in what will in effect be a secret armament race of a rather desperate character.  This is evidence to indicate that such activity may have already commenced.”

Secretary of War Henry Stimson agreed, “The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that the only way you can make a man trustworthy is to trust him.”   The position that there was no possible way of keeping the science behind the bomb a secret and that there should be free interchange of scientific information between the members of the United Nations was held by Dean Acheson representing the State Department and Abe Fortas representing Interior.  Treasury Secretary Fred Vinson, Attorney General Tom Clark, and Navy Secretary James Forrestal strongly disagreed.

H.A. concluded that “…there was the gravest danger that by putting the screws on our scientists and trying to maintain what we thought was a secret, other nations would go far beyond us in their discoveries.”  This sharing however, did not include manufacturing techniques in creating an atomic bomb, in advocating “the interchange of scientific information but not the interchange of techniques or ‘know-hows.’”  This sharing of information would have “a quid pro quo proviso that there be as much freedom for American scientific workers to work in Russian laboratories as for Russians to work in American laboratories.”

The media went crazy – and not just the conservative papers.  The New York Times, even though H.A. was clear that he opposed the sharing of weapons technology, said that the President wanted “to give the secret of the atomic bomb to Russia.” 

Members of Congress acted against the president.  The May-Johnson bill [Senators Edwin Johnson and Andrew May of Colorado and Kentucky respectively, both Democrats –A.S.], which was actually written by opposition factions within the Department of War, would restrict research and tightly control scientific information.  The proposed control board would be dominated by military and government officials would have the power to impose severe penalties for security violations.  The bill also emphasized the military uses of atomic energy.   This bill has many supporters, but with a strong lobbying campaign I believe we can defeat it.  

Legislation was the least of H.A.’s atomic problems.  Even though he was president, H.A. had a difficult time determining the status of atomic weapons in the military.  The Secretary of War confirmed that we did not have any nuclear weapons; however, H.A. later questioned General Leslie Groves who controlled the atomic materials he said that although we don’t currently have any atomic bombs we could easily assemble a few in less than a day.  H.A. was appalled that one man was essentially in charge of  U.S. atomic weapons and that person was Groves, who had once called FDR a son of a bitch and told off-color stories about Eleanor Roosevelt.  H.A. thought Groves had fascist tendencies.   H.A. is quickly putting together a reorganization to ensure civilian control of the atomic bomb.

©  2012 Ron Millar